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Abstract—Intruders can infer properties of a system by mea-
suring the time it takes for the system to respond to some
request of a given protocol, that is, by exploiting time side
channels. These properties may help intruders distinguish
whether a system is a honeypot or concrete system helping
him avoid defense mechanisms, or track a user among others
violating his privacy. Observational equivalence is the technical
machinery used for verifying whether two systems are distin-
guishable. Automating the check for observational equivalence
suffers the problem of state-space explosion problem. Symbolic
verification is used to mitigate this problem allow for the
verification of relatively large systems. This paper introduces
a novel definition of timed observational equivalence based on
symbolic time constraints. Protocol verification problems can
then be reduced to problems solvable by off-the-shelf SMT
solvers. We implemented such machinery in Maude and carry
out a number of preliminary experiments demonstrating the
feasibility of our approach.
1. Introduction
Time side channels can be exploited by intruders in
order to infer properties of systems, helping them avoid
defense mechanisms, and track users, violating their privacy.
For example, honeypots are normally used for attracting
intruders in order to defend real systems from their attacks.
However, as honeypots run over virtual machines whereas
normal client systems usually do not, it takes longer for
a honeypot to respond to some protocol requests. This
information can be used by the attacker to determine which
servers are real and which are honeypots. For another ex-
ample, passports using RFID mechanisms have been shown
to be vulnerable to privacy attacks. An intruder can track
a particular’s passport by replaying messages of previous
sessions and measuring response times.
The formal verification of such properties is different
from usual reachability based properties, such as secrecy, au-
thentication and other correspondence properties. In the ver-
ification of reachability properties, one searches for a trace
that exhibits the flaw, e.g., the intruder learning a secret.
In attacks such as the ones described above, one searches
instead for behaviors that can distinguish two system, e.g.,
a behavior that can be observed when interacting with one
system, but that cannot be observed when interacting with
the other system. That is, to check whether the systems
are observationally distinguishable. This requires reasoning
over sets of traces.
Various notions of observational equivalence have been
proposed in the programming languages community as well
as in concurrent systems [2], [7], [22], [28] using, for
example, logical relations and bisimulation. Observational
equivalence has also been proposed for protocol verification
notably the work of Cortier and Delaune [14]. A number
of properties, e.g., unlinkability and anonymity [3], have
been reduced to the problem of observational equivalence.
As protocol verification involves infinite domains, the use
of symbolic methods has been essential for the success of
such approaches.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold:
• Symbolic Timed Observational Equivalence: We pro-
pose a novel definition of timed equivalence over timed
protocol instances [30]. Timing information, e.g., du-
ration of computation, is left symbolically and can be
specified in the form of time constraints relating multiple
time symbols, e.g., tt1 ≥ tt2 + 10;
• SMT Solvers for proving Time Observational Equiv-
alence: SMT solvers are used in two different ways.
We specify the operational semantics of timed protocols
using Rewriting Modulo SMT [31]. Instead of instanti-
ating time symbols with concrete values, in Rewriting
Modulo SMT, a configuration of the system is symbolic
and therefore may represent an unbounded number of
concrete configurations. Rewriting of a symbolic config-
uration is only allowed if the set of (time) constraints in
the resulting state is satisfiable. SMT-Solvers are used to
perform this check. This means not only that there are
a finite number of symbolic traces starting from a given
configuration, but also reduces considerably the search
space needed to enumerate these traces. We demonstrate
this with experiments.
The second application of SMT-Solvers is on the proof
of timed observational equivalence, namely, to check
whether the timing of observations can be matched. This
check involves the checking for the satisfiability of ∃∀
formulas [17].
• Implementation: Relying on the Maude [12] support for
Rewriting Modulo SMT using the SMT-solvers CVC4 [4]
or Yices [?], we implemented in Maude the machinery
necessary for enumerating symbolic traces. However, as
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checking for the satisfiability of ∃∀ formulas [17] is not
supported by Maude, we integrate our Maude machinery
with the SMT solver Yices [17]. We carry out some
proof-of-concept experiments demonstrating the feasibil-
ity of our approach.
Section 2 describes some motivating examples on how
intruders can using time side channels for his benefit. We
introduce the basic symbolic language in Section 3 and the
timed protocol language in Section 4. Section 5 introduces
symbolic timed observational equivalence describing how to
prove this property. Section 6 describes our implementation
architecture and the experiments carried out. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude by commenting on related and future
work.
Some missing proofs are shown in the Appendix.
2. Examples
We discuss some motivating examples illustrating how
intruders can exploit time side channels of protocols.
Red Pill Our first example is taken from [23]. The attack
is based on the concept of red pills. The overall goal of the
attacker is to determine whether some system is running on a
virtual machine or not. As honeypots trying to lure attackers
normally run on virtual machines, determining if a system
is running on a virtual machines or not gives an attacker
one means to avoid honeypots [23]. The system running in
a virtual machine or a concrete machine follow exactly the
same protocol.
When an application connects to the malicious server,
the server first sends a baseline request followed by a
differential request. The time to respond to the baseline
request is same whether running in a virtual machine or
not and is used for calibration. The time to respond to
the differential request is longer when executed in a virtual
machine. When not taking time into account, the set of traces
for this exchange is the same whether the application is
running on a virtual machine or not. However, if we also
consider the time to respond to the two requests, the timed
traces of applications running on virtual machines can be
distingushed from those of applications running on native
hardware.
Passport RFID Our second example comes from work
of Chothia and Smirnov [11] investigating the security of
e-passports. These passports contain an RFID tag that,
when powered, broadcast information intended for passport
readers. Also, once powered, e-passport broadcasts can’t be
turned off. Chothia and Smirnov identified a flaw in one of
the passports protocols that makes it possible to trace the
movements of a particular passport, without having to break
the passports cryptographic key. In particular, if the attacker
records one session between the passport and a legitimate
reader, one of the recorded messages can be replayed to
distinguish that passport from other passports. Assuming
that the target carried their passport on them, an attacker
could place a device in a doorway that would detect when
the target entered or left a building. In the protocol, the
passport receives an encryption and a mac verifying the
integrity of the encryption. The protocol first checks the
mac, and reports an error if the check fails. If the mac
check succeeds, it checks the encryption. This will fail if the
encryption isn’t fresh. When the recorded encryption, mac
pair is replayed to the recorde passport, the mac check will
succeed but the encryption check will fail, while the mac
check will fail when carried out by any other passport as it
requires a key unique to the passport. The time to failure is
significantly longer for the targeted passport than for others,
since only the mac check is needed and it is faster.
Anonymous Protocol Abadi and Fournet [1] proposed an
anonymous group protocol where members of a group can
communicate within each other without revealing that they
belong to the same group. A member of a group broadcasts a
message, m, encrypted with the shared group key. Whenever
a member of a group receives this message, it is able to
decrypt the message and then check whether the sender
indeed belongs to the group and if the message is directed
to him. In this case, the receiver broadcasts an encrypted
response m′.
Whenever a player that is not member of the group
receives the message m, it does not simply drop the message,
but sends a decoy message with the same shape as if he
belongs to the group, i.e., in the same shape as m′. In
this way, other participants and outsiders cannot determine
whether a two players belong to the same group or not.
However, as argued in [13], by measuring the time when
a response is issued, an intruder can determine whether two
players belong to the same group. This is because decrypting
and generating a response take longer than just sending a
decoy message.
3. Term Language
The basic term language contains usual cryptographic
operators such as encryption, nonces, tuples. More precisely
the term language is defined by the following grammar. We
assume given text constants, T and player names P. We
also assume a countable set of nonces, N , and of symbols,
Syms, as well as a countable number of sorted variables,
V, where N ,Syms and V are disjoint. Below vp represents
a variable of sort player.
Basic Constants:
c := t ∈ T Text Constants
| p ∈ P Player Names
| n ∈ N Nonces
Keys:
k := | symk Symmetric key
| pk(p) | pk(vp) Public key of a player
| sk(p) | sk(vp) Secret key of a player
Symbols:
sym := | sym ∈ Syms Symbol
Terms:
m := c Basic constants
| k Keys
| v ∈ V Variables
| sym ∈ Syms Symbols
| e(m, k) Encryption of term m with key k
| 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 Tuples
A term is ground if it does not contain any occurrence
of variables and symbols. A term is symbolic if it does
not contain any occurrence of variables, but it may contain
occurrences of symbols. ms,ms1,ms2, . . . will range over
symbolic terms. We define Syms(ms) as the set of symbols
appearing in a symbolic term.
It is possible to add other cryptographic constructions,
such as hash, signatures, but in order to keep things simple
and more understandable, we only include encryption. As
hashes and signatures can be specified using encryption, this
is not limiting. Finally, it is easy to extend the results here
with fresh keys. These are treated in the same way as nonces,
but to keep it simple, we do not include them.
We will use two types of (capture avoiding) substitu-
tions. Variable substitutions written sb, sb1, sb2, . . . which
are maps from variables to symbolic terms sb = [v1 7→
ms1, v2 7→ ms2, . . . , vn 7→ msn]. Symbol substitutions writ-
ten ssb, ssb1, ssb2, . . . mapping symbols to symbolic terms
ssb = [sym1 7→ ms1, sym2 7→ ms2, . . . , symn 7→ msn].
3.1. Symbolic Term Constraints
Intuitively, variables are entities that can be replaced
by symbolic terms, while a symbol denotes a (possibly
infinite) set of terms. For example, if the symbol sym j
can be instantiated by any one of the (symbolic) terms
{ms1, . . . ,msn}, then the symbolic term e(sym, k) represents
the set of terms:
{e(ms, k) | ms ∈ {ms1, . . . ,msn}}
Such simple idea has enabled the verification of security
protocols, which have infinite search space on ground terms,
but finite state space using symbolic terms.
We formalize this idea by using derivability constraints.
Derivability constraints are constructed over minimal sets
defined below.
Definition 3.1. A set of symbolic messages S is minimal if
it satisfies the following conditions:
• S contains all guessable constants, such as player names
and public keys;
• S does not contain tuples;
• if e(ms, k) ∈ S if and only if k−1 < S where k−1 is the
inverse key of k;
Formally, the symbolic terms derivable from S is the small-
est set R defined inductively as follows:
• if ms ∈ S then ms ∈ R;
• if k ∈ R and ms ∈ R, then e(ms, k) ∈ R;
• if ms′1, . . . ,ms
′
m ∈ R, then 〈ms′1, . . . ,ms′m〉 ∈ R;
From two minimal sets, S1 and S2, we can construct
the minimal set, S, representing the union of S1 and S2
by applying the following operations until a fixed point is
reached starting from S0 = S1 ∪ S2:
• e(m, k) ∈ Si and k−1 ∈ Si, then Si+1 = Si ∪ {m};
• e(m, k), k, k−1 ∈ Si, then Si+1 = Si \ {e(m, k)} ∪ {m};
• 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 ∈ Si, then Si+1 = Si \ {〈m1, . . . ,mn〉} ∪
{m1, . . . ,mn}.
For example, given the minimal sets:
S1 = {symk, pk} and S2 = {e(〈e(t, sk), t〉, symk)}
The minimal set obtained by the union of S1 and S2 is:
S = {symk, pk, t, e(t, sk)}
We consider two types of constraints on terms: Deriv-
ability constraints (Definition 3.2) and comparison con-
straints (Definition 3.6).
Definition 3.2. A derivability constraint has the form
dc(sym,S), where S is minimal. This constraint denotes
that sym can be any (symbolic) term derived from S.
For example, the derivability constraint
dc(sym, {alice, bob, eve, pk(alice), pk(bob), sk(eve)})
specifies that sym may be instantiated by, e.g., the
terms 〈alice, bob〉, 〈alice, sk(eve)〉, e(alice, pk(bob)),
e(〈alice, bob〉, pk(bob)) and so on.
To improve readability (and also reflect our imple-
mentation), we will elide in any constraint dc(sym,S)
the guessable terms. For example, we write the derivabil-
ity constraint above simply as dc(sym(1), {sk(eve), }) as
alice, bob, eve, pk(alice), pk(bob) are all guessables, namely
player names and public keys.
Notice that any dc(sym,S) denotes a infinite number of
symbolic terms due to the tupling closure. We will abuse
notation and use ms ∈ dc(sym, {ms1, . . . ,msn}) to denote
that the symbolic term ms is in the set of terms that sym
can be instantiated with. Moreover, we assume that for any
given set of derivability constraints DC, there is at most
one derivability constraint for any given sym, that is, if
dc(sym,S1), dc(sym,S2) ∈ DC, then S1 = S2. We write
dom(DC) = {sym | dc(sym,S) ∈ DC}. We write DC(sym)
for the derivability constraint for sym in DC if it exists.
Moreover, we write ms ∈ DC(sym) if the term can be
derived from DC(sym).
Definition 3.3. The symbol dependency graph of a given set
of derivability constraints DC, written GDC, is a directed
graph defined as follows:
• Its nodes are symbols in DC, that is, dom(DC);
• It contains the edge sym1 −→ sym2 if and only if
dc(sym1,S1), dc(sym2,S2) ∈ DC and S2 contains at
least one occurrence of sym1.
While in general the symbol dependency graph of DC
can be cyclic, our operational semantics will ensure that
these graphs are acyclic.
Consider the following set of derivability constraints:
DC0 =

dc(sym1, {sk(eve)}), dc(sym2, {e(sym1, symk)}),
dc(sym3, {e(〈sym2, sym1〉, pk(Alice)}),
dc(sym4, {sym3, sym2})}),

Its dependency graph is the directed acyclic graph (DAG).
sym1
sym2
sym3
sym4
Whenever the dependency graph of a set of constraints is
a DAG, we classify the set as acyclic. We can compute a
topological sort of the DAG in linear time. For example, a
topological sort of GDC0 is [sym1, sym2, sym3, sym4].
Given a set of derivability constraints, we can now
formally specify the set of terms that a symbolic term
denotes.
Definition 3.4. Let ms be a symbolic term. Let DC
be an acyclic set of derivability constraints. As-
sume dc(sym,S) ∈ DC. We define the operator
S ubDC(sym,ms) as the set of symbolic terms obtained
by replacing all occurrences of sym in ms by a term
ms1 ∈ DC(sym). Formally, the set:{
σ(ms) | σ = {sym 7→ ms1}
is a substitution where ms1 ∈ DC(sym)
}
Moreover, S ubDC(sym,S) for a set of symbolic terms
S is the set ⋃ms∈S S ubDC(sym,ms).
Let T = [sym1, . . . , symn] be any topological sort of the
DAG GDC. Then the meaning of a symbolic term ms
with respect to DC, written DC(ms), is the set obtained
by applying S ubDC consecutively as follows:
S ubDC(sym1, S ubDC(sym2, S ubDC(. . . S ubDC(symn,ms) · · · ))).
For example, S ubDC0 (sym(4), e(sym(4), pk(bob))) is the
set of terms:
{e(ms1, pk(bob)) | ms1 ∈ DC0(sym(4))}
It contains the terms e(sym2, pk(bob)), e(sym3, pk(bob)),
e(〈sym2, sym2〉, pk(bob)), e(〈sym2, sym3〉, pk(bob)), . . ..
The set DC0(e(sym4, pk(bob))) contains the terms
e(e(sk(eve), symk), pk(bob)), by applying to the term
e(sym4, pk(bob)) the substitution [sym4 7→ sym2] followed
by [sym2 7→ e(sym1, symk)] [sym1 7→ sk(eve)].
Notice that for any acyclic set of derivability constraints
such that its lowest height symbols (w.r.t. GDC) have con-
straints of the form dc(sym,S) where S are ground terms,
then DC(ms) is an (infinite) set of ground terms. This is
because the successive application of S ubDC will eventually
eliminate all symbols.
Given terms ms,ms′, we describe how to check whether
ms ∈ DC(ms′). We first build the matching subsitution
ssb = {sym′1 7→ ms1, . . . , sym′n 7→ msn} from symbols in
ms′ to (sub)terms in ms. If no such matching subsitution
exists, then ms < DC(ms′). For each sym′i 7→ msi, let
dc(symi,Si) ∈ DC. We check whether msi ∈ DC(sym′i)
recursively as follows:
• If msi ∈ Si, return true;
• If ms1 = e(ms2,ms3), then we check whether
〈ms2,ms3〉 ∈ DC(sym′i);
• if msi = {ms1i , . . . ,msmi }, then for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we
check whether ms ji ∈ DC(sym′i).
Definition 3.5. ssb  DC if for each sym 7→ ms ∈ ssb,
ms ∈ DC(sym).
The following definitions specify the second type of term
constraints called comparison constraints.
Definition 3.6. A comparison constraint is either an equality
constraint of the form eq(ms1,ms2) or an inequality
constraint of the form neq(ms1,ms2).
A set EQ of comparison constraints should be interpreted
as a conjunction of constraints. The following definition
specifies when it is satisfiable.
Definition 3.7. Let DC be a set of derivability constraints
and EQ be a set of comparison constraints. The set EQ
is satisfiable w.r.t. DC, written DC  EQ, if there is a
subsitution σ = {sym1 7→ m1, . . . , symn 7→ mn} mapping
all symbols symi in EQ to ground terms in DC(symi),
such that:
• for all equality constraints eq(ms,ms′) ∈ EQ, σ[ms] =
σ[ms′];
• for all inequality constraints neq(ms,ms′) ∈ EQ,
σ[ms] , σ[ms′].
We define the procedure below, eqCheck, for checking
whether a set of comparison constraints EQ is satisfiable.
Definition 3.8. Let EQ be a (finite) set of comparison
constraints and DC a set of derivability constraints. Let
eq(ms1,ms′1), eq(ms2,ms
′
2) . . . eq(msn,ms
′
n) be all the
equality constraints in EQ. Then eqCheck(EQ,DC) is
true if and only if
1) There is a unifer ssb of the terms α = 〈ms1, . . . ,msn〉
and β = 〈ms′1, . . . ,ms′n〉 mapping symbols to symbolic
terms, that is, ssb(α) = ssb(β);
2) For all inequality constraint neq(ms,ms′) ∈ EQ,
ssb[ms] , ssb[ms′];
3) ssb is consistent with DC (as done in Section 3.3).
Lemma 3.9. DC  EQ if and only if eqCheck(EQ,DC).
Moreover, the meaning of a symbolic term should take
comparison constraints EQ into account. That is, it should
not be possible to replace a symbol by a term that falsi-
fies some comparison constraint. We extend Definition 3.4
accordingly.
Definition 3.10. Let DC be an acyclic set of derivability
constraints and EQ a set of comparison constraints. The
meaning of a symbolic term ms w.r.t. DC and EQ,
written DC(ms)|EQ, is the set of terms ms′ ∈ DC(ms)
such that there exists a matching substitution θ:
• θ(ms) = ms′;
• For all equality constraints eq(ms1,ms2) ∈ EQ, θ(ms1) =
θ(ms2);
• For all inequality constraints neq(ms1,ms2) ∈ EQ,
θ(ms1) , θ(ms2).
For example, dc(sym1, {t1}), dc(sym2, {t2}) ∈ DC
and a set of a single comparison constraint EQ =
{eq(sym1, sym2)}. The term 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ DC(〈sym1, sym2〉),
but 〈t1, t2〉 < DC(〈sym1, sym2〉)|EQ. This is because the
matching substitution θ = {sym1 7→ t1, sym2 7→ t2} turns
the constraint eq(sym1, sym2) false: t1 , t2.
3.2. Symbolic Time Constraints
Assume a time signature Ξ which is disjoint to the
message alphabet Σ. It contains numbers (real and natural),
variables and pre-defined functions.
r1, r2, . . . A set of numbers;
tt1, tt2, . . . , A set of time variables;
including the special variable cur
+,−,×, /, floor, ceiling, . . . A set of pre-defined functions.
Time Expressions are constructed inductively by apply-
ing arithmetic symbols to time expressions. For example
ceiling((2 + tt + cur)/10) is a Time Expression. The symbols
tr1, tr2, . . . range over Time Expressions. We do not constrain
the set of numbers and function symbols in Ξ. However, in
practice, we allow only the symbols supported by the SMT
solver used. All examples in this paper will contain SMT
supported symbols (or equivalent). Finally, the time variable
cur will be a keyword in our protocol specification language
denoting the current global time.
Definition 3.11 (Symbolic Time Constraints). Let Ξ be
a time signature. The set of symbolic time constraints
is constructed inductively using time expressions as fol-
lows: Let tr1, tr2 be time expressions, then
tr1 = tr2, tr1 ≥ tr2 tr1 > tr2, tr1 < tr2, and tr1 ≤ tr2
are Symbolic Time Constraints.
For example, cur + 10 < floor(tt − 5) is a Time Constraint.
Time Constraints will range over tc, tc1, tc2, . . ..
Intutively, given a set of time constraints TC, each of
its models with concrete instantiations for the time variables
corresponds to a particular scenario. This means that one
single set of time constraints denotes a possibly infinite num-
ber of concrete scenarios. For example, the set of constraints
{tt1 ≤ 2, tt2 ≥ 1 + tt1} has an infinite number of models, e.g.,
[tt1 7→ 2.1, tt2 7→ 3.1415].
Finally, SMT-solvers, such as CVC4 [4] and Yices [17],
can check for the satisfiability of a set of time constraints.
3.3. Symbolic Constraint Solving
For protocol verification, we will assume a traditional
Dolev-Yao intruder [15], that is, an intruder that can con-
struct messages from his knowledge by tupling and encrypt-
ing messages. However, he cannot decrypt a message for
which he does not possess the inverse key. This is captured
by the definition of minimal sets Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.12. An intruder knowledge IK is a minimal
set of symbolic terms.
During protocol execution, the intruder sends messages
to honest participants constructed from his knowledge base.
Suppose an honest player is ready to receive a message
matching a term m, possibly containing variables. Rather
than considering all possible ground instances of m that
the intruder could send, we consider a finite representation
of thie set, namely symbolic messages where the possi-
ble values of the symbols are constrained by derivability
constraints. To compute this this representation the intruder
replaces variables with symbolic terms, possibly containing
fresh symbols, and then constrains the symbols so that the
allowed instances are exactly the terms matching m that the
intruder can derive from his current knowledge IK .
For example, consider the term m =
e({v1, sym, v1, v2}, k) (which is expected as input by
an honest player). Here v1 and v2 are variables and sym
is constrained by derivability constraints DC. We create
two fresh symbols sym1 and sym2 for, respectively,
the variables v1 and v2. We use sb to denote such
substitution of variables by symbolic terms. In this
example sb = [v1 7→ sym1, v2 7→ sym2]. We then obtain
ms = sb[m] = e({sym1, sym, sym1, sym2}, k).
It remains to solve the following problem:
Given an intruder knowledge, IK , and a set of
derivability constraints DC constraining the symbols in
IK , find a representation of all instances of a symbolic
term ms, satisfying DC, that can be generated from IK .
We implemented the function called sgen that enu-
merates all possible instances. Its specification is in the
Appendix. We describe sgen informally next and illustrate
it with some examples. A similar algorithm is also used
by [14].
In particular, sgen(m,IK ,DC) takes as input a term
m, which is expected by the honest participant, the intruder
knowledge IK and the derivability constraints DC for
the existing symbols. sgen(m,IK ,DC) then generates as
output a pair:
{sb, {ssb1,DC1} . . . {ssbk,DCk}}
where sb maps the variables of m to symbols, and each
{ssbi,DCi} is a solution to the problem above for ms =
sb[m]. If k = 0, then there are no solutions, that is, the
intruder is not able to generate a term which matches m.
Intuitively, the function sgen constructs a solution by
either matching m with a term in his knowledge IK (base
case) or constructing m from terms in IK and using tupling
and encryption. The following examples illustrates the dif-
ferent cases involved:
Example 3.13. Consider the following cases for deriving
the term m = e({v, sym}, k).
• Case 1 (matching with a term in IK): Assume:
IK = {e(na, sym1), k)}DC = dc(sym, {na, nc}) dc(sym1,S)
Then the solution of sgen is:
{sb, {[symv 7→ na, sym 7→ sym1], dc(sym1, add({na, nc},S))}}
where sb = [v 7→ symv] and symv is a fresh symbol. No-
tice that since symv is mapped to a particular term (na),
no derivability constraint for it is generated. Additionally,
notice that sym is constrained to be the same as sym1.
This causes the removal of the derivability constraint
dc(sym1,S);
• Case 2 (constructing terms from IK): Assume that k ∈
IK and IK has no encryption term. Then the solution
of sgen is:
{[v 7→ symv], {[],DC}}
which corresponds to generatign the term
e({symv, sym}, k).
• Case 3 [No Solution]: Assume that IK = {e(na, nb), k)}
andDC = dc(sym, {na, nc}). Since sym cannot be instan-
tiated to nb, the intruder cannot use the term e(na, nb), k).
4. Timed Protocol Language
The language used to specify a cryptographic protocol
has the standard constructions, such as the creation of fresh
values, sending and receiving messages. Moreover, it also
includes “if then else” constructors needed to specify, for
example, the RFID protocol used by passports. A protocol
is composed of a set of roles.
Definition 4.1 (Timed Protocols). The set of Timed Pro-
tocols, TL, is composed of Timed Protocol Roles, pl,
which are constructed by using commands as specified
by the following grammar:
nil Empty Protocol
| (new v # tc), pl Fresh Constant
| (+m # tc), pl Timed Message Output
| (−m # tc), pl Timed Message Input
| (if (m1 := m2) # tc Timed Conditional
then pl1 else pl2)
Intuitively, new generates a fresh value binding it to
the variable v, (+m # tc) denotes sending the term m
and the (−m # tc) receiving a term, and (if m1 :=
m2 # tc then pl1 else pl2) denotes that if m1 can be matched
with ms2, that is, instantiate the variables in m1 so that the
resulting term is ms2, then the protocol proceeds by execu-
tion pl1 and otherwise to pl2. A command is only applicable
if the associated constraint tc is satisfiable. We elide the
associated time constraint whenever tc is a tautology, that
is, it is always true.
Example 4.2. The Needham-Schroeder [29] protocol is
specified as follows where X,Y are variables:
Alice := (new Na), (+e(〈Na, alice〉, pk(Z))),
(−e(〈Na,Y〉, pk(alice)})), (+e(Y, pk(Z)))
Bob := (−e(〈X,Z〉, pk(bob))), (new Nb),
(+e(〈X,Nb〉, pk(Z)})), (−e(Nb, pk(bob)))
Example 4.3. Consider the following protocol role which
is a modification of Alice’s role in the Needham-
Schroeder’s protocol (Example 4.2):
Alice := (new Na), (+e(〈Na, alice〉, pk(Z))), (−v),
if v := e(〈Na,Y〉, pk(alice)})
then (+e(Y, pk(Z)))
else (+error)
Here, Alice checks whether the received message v has
the expected shape before proceeding. If it does not have
this shape, then she sends an error message.
Example 4.4. The following role specifies the verifier of a
(very simple) distance bounding protocol [8]:
(new v), (+v # tt = cur), (−v # cur ≤ tt + 4)
It creates a fresh constant and sends it to the prover,
remembering the current global time by assigning it to
the time variable tt. Finally, when it receives the response
v it checks whether the current time is less than tt + 4.
Example 4.5 (Passport). Timed conditionals can be used
to specify the duration of operations, such as checking
whether some message is of a given form. In practice,
the duration of these operations can be measured empir-
ically to obtain a finer analysis of the protocol [11].
For example, consider the following protocol role:
(new v), (+v), (−{venc, vmac} # tt0 = cur),
if (vmac := e(venc, kM)) # tt1 = tt0 + ttMac
then (if (venc := e(v, kE)) # tt2 = tt1 + ttEnc)
then (+done # cur = tt2) else (+error # cur = tt2))
else (+error # cur = tt1)
This role creates a fresh value v and sends it. Then
it is expecting a pair of two messages vmac and venc,
remembering at time variable tt0 when this message is
received. It then checks whether the first component vmac
is of the form e(venc, kM)), i.e., it is the correct MAC.
This operation takes ttmac time units. The time variable
tt1 is equal to the time tt0 + ttmac, i.e., the time when the
message was received plus the MAC check duration.
If the MAC is not correct, an error message is sent
exactly at time tt1. Otherwise, if the first component,
vMAC , is as expected, the role checks whether the second
component, venc, is an encryption of the form e(v, kE)),
which takes (a longer) time ttenc. If so it sends the done
message, otherwise the error message, both at time tt2
which is tt1 + ttenc.
Example 4.6 (Red Pill Example). We abstract the part
of sending the baseline message, e.g., the messages
that establish the connection to the server, and the part
that sends the differential messages. We assume that it
takes dBase to complete the exchange of the baseline
messages.
(−(baseline req) # tt0 = cur),
(+(baseline done) # cur = tt0 + dBase),
(−(diff req) # tt1 = cur)
(+(diff done) # cur = tt1 + dAppl)
Then the part of the protocol that depends on the appli-
cation starts. We abstract this part using the messages
diff req and diff done. If the application is running
over a virtual machine, then dAppl takes dVirtual time
units; otherwise dAppl takes dReal time units, where
dVirtual > dReal.
The intruder can distinguish whether an application is
running over a virtual machine or not by measuring the
time it takes to complete the exchange of diff req and
diff done messages.
Example 4.7 (Anonymous Protocol). We specify (a simpli-
fied version of the) anonymous group protocol proposed
by Abadi and Fournet for private authentication [1].
Whenever a broadcasted message is received by an
agent, it checks whether it has been encrypted with the
group key KB. If this is the case, then it checks whether
the player sending the message with key vG is part of
the group. If so, then it sends a response encrypted with
his private key. Otherwise, he sends a decoy message.
−({hello), e({hello, vn, vG, }, kG)} # tt0 = cur
if kG := KB # tt1 = tt0 + dEnc
then
if vG := KA # tt2 = tt1 + dCheck
then + ({ack, e(rsp, kB)}) # cur = tt1 + dCreate
else + ({ack, e(decoy, kB)}) # cur = tt1
else + ({ack, e(decoy, kB)}) # cur = tt1
Notice the use of time constraints to capture that the
steps of the protocol take some time, namely dCheck
and dCreate.
4.1. Operational Semantics for Timed Protocols
The operational semantics of timed protocols is given in
Figure 1. The rewrite rules are rewrite configurations defined
below:
Definition 4.8. A symbolic term configuration has the form
〈P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG, where
• P is a set of player roles of the form [n | pl | keys]
composed by an identifier, n, a protocol pl, and a set of
known keys keys;
• IK is the intruder knowledge;
• DC is a set of derivability constraints;
• EQ is a set of comparison constraints;
• TC is a set of time constraints;
• tG is a time symbol representing global time.
The operational semantics of timed protocols is defined
in Figure 1. The New rule replaces the (bound) variable
v by a fresh nonce nν. The Send rule sends a message
ms which is then added to the intruder knowledge. The
Receive rule expects a term of the form m. The function
sgen(m,IK ,DC) returns the variable substitution sb and
a set of solutions {ssb,DC1} css. Each solution intuitively
generates a different trace. We apply sb in the remaining of
the program pl and apply the symbol substitution ssb to all
symbols in the resulting configuration. This rule also has a
proviso that the message ms = ssb[sb[m]] is encrypted with
keys that can be decrypted by the honest participant. This is
specified by the function isReceivable. Finally, it also adds
to the set of keys of the honest participant keys, the keys
he can learn from the message ms. The rule If-true checks
whether the terms m1 and ms1 can be matched from the
intruder knowledge IK . This is done by the function sgenB
which is defined in a similar fashion as sgen. It then adds
the equality constraint to the set of comparison constraints.
Finally, the rule If-false replaces the variables in m by fresh
symbols, constrained in DC′ with the intruder knowlegde.
That is if symν is a fresh symbol, then dc(symν,IK). It also
adds the corresponding inequality constraint. The intuition
of replacing variables in m1 by fresh symbols is to specify
that for any instance of these variables, the resulting term
cannot be matched with ms2 as specifies the inequality
constraint.
Example 4.9. Consider the Needham-Schroeder protocol in
Example 4.2. Assume that the intruder initially only
knows his secret key (and the guessables), IK0 =
{sk(eve)} and there are no symbols DC = ∅. An ex-
ecution of Alice’s protocol role is as follows. Alice
creates a fresh constant Na and sends the message
e(〈Na, alice〉, pk(eve)). At this point, the intruder knowl-
edge is:
IK1 = IK0 ∪ {Na}
He now can send a message to Bob,
namely e(〈sym1, sym2〉, pk(bob)) where
sym1, sym2 are fresh and constrained DC1 ={dc(sym1,IK1), dc(sym2,IK1)}. At this point,
Bob creates a fresh value Nb and sends the message
e(〈sym1,Nb〉, pk(sym2)}). The intruder learns this
message (and no further):
IK2 = IK1 ∪ {e(〈sym1,Nb〉, pk(sym2)})}
Now, the intruder can fool alice by sending her a mes-
sage of the form e(〈Na,Y〉, pk(alice)}). We create a fresh
symbol sym3 for Y obtaining e(〈Na, sym3〉, pk(alice)})
and attempt to generate this message from IK2 us-
ing sgen. Indeed we can generate this message using
e(〈sym1,Nb〉, pk(sym2)}) ∈ IK2. This generates the
ssb = [sym1 7→ Na, sym2 7→ alice, sym3 7→ Nb]. This
substitution is consistent with DC1. Notice that sym3
is not constrained. The protocol finishes by the intruder
simply forwarding the message send by alice to bob.
Bob then thinks he is communicating with alice, but he
is not.
Each rule has two general provisos. The first is that the
resulting set of comparison constraints should be consistent.
This can be checked as defined in Definition 3.8.
The second, more interesting, condition is on the time
symbols. Whenever a rule is applied, time constraints TC1
are added to the configuration’s constraint set. These time
constraints are obtained by replacing cur in tc with tG1
together with the constraint tG1 ≥ tG0 specifying that time
can only advance. The rule is fired only if the resulting set
of time constraints (TC∪TC1) is consistent, which can be
done using SMT solver. This way of specifying systems is
called Rewriting Modulo SMT [31].
Definition 4.10. Let R be the set of rules in Figure 1. A
timed trace is a labeled sequence of transitions written
C1 l1−→ C2 l2−→ · · · ln−1−→ Cn such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1, Ci −→ Ci+1 is an instance of a rule in R and li is
+ms@tG1 if it is an instance of Send rule sending term
ms at time tG1, −ms@tG1 if it is an instance of Receive
rule receiving term ms at time tG1, and ∅ otherwise.
The use of rewriting modulo SMT considerably reduces
the search space. Timed protocols are infinite state systems,
as time symbols can be instantiated by any (positive) real
number. With the use of rewriting modulo SMT we simply
have to accumulate constraints. Only traces with satisfiable
sets of time constraints are allowed. Indeed, as we describe
in Section 6, the number of traces is not only finite (as stated
in the following Proposition), but very low (less than 40
traces). As observational equivalence involves the matching
of traces, checking for observational equivalence can be
automated.
Proposition 4.11. The set of traces starting from any con-
figuration C0 is finite.
Proposition 4.12. Let τ = C1 l1−→ C2 l2−→ · · · ln−1−→ Cn be a
trace. For any Ci = 〈Pi,IK i,DCi,EQi〉, such that 1 ≤
i ≤ n, the following holds:
• For any i ≤ j ≤ n, DCn(IK i)|EQn ⊆ DCn(IK j)|EQn , that
is, the intruder knowledge can only increase;
• DCi is an acyclic set of derivability constraints;
• Let symk be a symbol created in some Ck, k <
i and let symi be a symbol created in Ci. If
dc(symk,Sk), dc(symi,Si) ∈ DCi, then Sk ⊆ Si. That
is, symbols that are introduced at a later transitions can
be instantiated by more terms than symbols introduced
at earlier transitions.
Timed Intruders: In fact, our implementation generalizes
the machinery in this section by considering multiple timed
intruders [25], [30]. As described in [25], the standard
Dolev-Yao may not be suitable for the verificaiton of Cyber-
Physical Security Protocols where the physical properties of
the environment is important. Differently from the Dolev-
Yao intruder, a timed intruder needs to wait for the message
to arrive before he can learn it. [30] proved an upper-bound
on the number of timed intruders. Our tool implements this
strategy. However, for the examples considered here, the
standard Dolev-Yao intruder is enough.
5. Observational Equivalence
Our goal now is to determine when two term con-
figurations CI = 〈PI ,IK I ,DCI ,EQI ,TCI〉@tG and C′I =〈P′I ,IK ′I ,DC′I ,EQ′I ,TC′I〉@tG′ cannot be distinguished by
the Dolev-Yao intruder. That is, for any trace starting from
CI there is an equivalent trace starting from C′I . The fol-
lowing definition specifies observables which collect the
necessary information from a trace:
Definition 5.1. Let τ = C1 l1−→ C2 l2−→ · · · ln−1−→ Cn =
〈Pn,IKn,DCn,EQn,TCn〉@tGn be a timed trace. Its
observable is the tuple 〈ttI ,Lτ,IKn,DCn,EQn,TCn〉,
where ttI is the global time at configuration C1, Lτ
is the sequence of non-empty labels in τ. Let C be a
configuration. Let T (C) be the set of all traces with
initial configuration C. The observables of C is O(C) =
{Oτ | τ ∈ T (C)}, that is, the set of all observables of
traces starting from C.
Two configurations are observationally equivalent if their
observables are equivalent.
Definition 5.2. A configuration C approximates a configura-
tion C′, written C  C′ if for any O ∈ O(C) there exists
an equivalent observable O′ ∈ O(C′), that is, O ∼ O′
(Definition 5.3). The configurations are observationally
equivalent, written C ∼ C′, if and only if C  C′ and
C′  C.
Definition 5.3. Let O = 〈L,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG and
O′ = 〈L′,IK ′,DC′,EQ′,TC′〉@tG′ be two observ-
ables, such that L = {(±1ms1@tG1) . . . (±pmsp@tGp)}
and L′ = {(±′1ms′1@tG′1) . . . (±′nms′n@tG′n)}. The obser-
vation O is equivalent to O′, written O ∼ O′ if the
following conditions are all true:
1) p = n = N, that is, they have the same length N;
2) ±i = ±′i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N, that is, have the same label
type;
3) There is a black-box bijection bij(O,O′) between O and
O′ (Definition 5.6);
4) The messages observed are equivalent, that is,
〈ms1, . . . ,msN〉 ∼O,O′ 〈ms′1, . . . ,ms′N〉 (Definition 5.7);
5) Assume t˜t and t˜t′ are the set of time symbols in TC and
TC′, respectively. The following formulas are tautolo-
gies:
∀t˜t.
[
TC ⇒ ∃t˜t′. [TC′ ∧ tG1 = tG′1 ∧ · · · ∧ tGN = tG′N]]
∀t˜t′.
[
TC′ ⇒ ∃t˜t. [TC ∧ tG1 = tG′1 ∧ · · · ∧ tGN = tG′N]]
specifying that for any time tG1, . . . , tGN satisfying TC
when the messages ms1, . . . ,msN were observed in O,
we can find tG′1, . . . , tG
′
N satisfying TC′, that makes the
time of observation equal.
The first two conditions are clear. If two observables
differ on the number of observations or they differ on their
types, then they can be distinguished. We motivate and
define next the conditions 3 and 4 of black-box bijections
and term approximation. Finally, the condition 5 specifies
that the intruder cannot distinguish the observed messages
by measuring the time when they are observed.
New: 〈[n | (new v # tc), pl | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG0 −→ 〈[n | sb[pl] | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC1〉@tG1
where nν is a fresh nonce and sb = [v 7→ nν]
Send: 〈[n | (+ms # tc), pl | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG0 −→ 〈[n | pl | keys] P,IK ∪ {ms},DC,EQ,TC1〉@tG1
Receive: 〈[n | (−m # tc), pl | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG0 −→
ssb[〈[n | sb[pl] | addKeys(ms, keys)] P,IK ,DC1,EQ,TC1〉]@tG1
where {sb, {ssb,DC1} css} := sgen(m,IK ,DC) and ms = ssb[sb[m]] and isReceivable(ms, keys)
If-true: 〈[n | (if (m1 := ms2 # tc) then pl1 else pl2) | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG0 −→
ssb[〈[n | sb[pl1] | keys P,IK ,DC1,EQ ∪ {eq(sb[m1], sb[ms2])},TC1〉]@tG1
where {sb, {ssb,DC1} css} := sgenB(m1 = ms2,IK ,DC)
If-false: 〈[n | (if m1 := ms2 then pl1 else pl2) | keys] P,IK ,DC,EQ〉 −→〈[n | sb[pl2] | keys] P,IK ,DC ∪DC′,EQ ∪ {neq(sb[m1],ms2)}〉
where sb replaces the variables in m1 by fresh symbols which are constrained with IK in DC′
Figure 1. Operational semantics for basic protocols. Here sb is a substitution mapping the variables in m by fresh symbols; and the function rng applies
the symbol substitution ssb to the range of the variable substitution sb; tc1 is the time constraint obtained by replacing cur in tc by the global time tG1;
and TC1 = TC ∪ {tG1 ≥ tG0, tc1}. The function isReceivable checks whether the message ssb[sb[m]] can be decrypted with the keys he has in keys.
Every rule has the proviso that the set of comparison constraints and the set of time constraints should be satisfiable. Rules are only applicable if the set
of time constraints are consistent.
5.1. Black-Boxed Terms
There are some subtleties involved in handling nonces
and handling encrypted terms for which the intruder does
not possess the inverse key. Consider the two following
sequence of labels:
L1 = 〈(+n1), (+n2), (+〈n1, n2〉)〉
L2 = 〈(+n1), (+n2), (+〈n2, n1〉)〉
where n1, n2 are nonces, say created by an honest partici-
pant. The intruder can distinguish these observables because
of the order of the pair of the last send messages. However,
the intruder should not be able to distinguish the following
two sequence of labels:
L′1 = 〈(+n1), (+n2), (+〈n1, n2〉)〉L′2 = 〈(+n′1), (+n′2), (+〈n′1, n′2〉)〉
where n1, n′1, n2, n
′
2 are nonces. This is because although
different constants, they are appear in the same order. The
same happens for encrypted terms that the intruder cannot
decrypt.1 Consider the following two sequence of labels:
L′′1 = 〈(+e(t1, k1)), (+e(t2, k2)), (+〈e(t1, k1), e(t2, k2)〉)〉L′′2 = 〈(+e(t′1, k′1)), (+e(t′2, k′2)), (+〈e(t′2, k′2), e(t′1, k′1)〉)〉
where t1, t2 are different constants and k1, k2 are keys for
which the intruder does not possess the decryption key. Al-
though the intruder cannot decrypt the exchanged messages,
he can still distinguish L′′1 and L′′2 because of the order of
last tuple sent.
The definition below specifies when two observables are
equal. It uses definition of black-box bijections and term
equivalences defined in the following.
Definition 5.4. Let O = 〈L,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG be an
observable. The set of black-box terms of O is the set,
1Recall that from the Dolev-Yao intruder’s point of view, such terms
are treated as black-boxes.
written BB(O), of all sub-terms in L that are nonces, n,
or encryption terms, e(t, k), for which the inverse of k
is not in IK .
Definition 5.5. Let O be an observable. A symbolic term
ms restricted to BB(O), written, ms|BB(O), is the term
obtained by replacing by the special symbol ∗ all sub-
terms of ms that (1) do not contain any term in BB(O)
or (2) is not contained in a term in BB(O).
For example, the consider the term ms =
〈n1, t1, e(〈t2, e(t3, k2)〉, k1)〉 where the intruder knows
the inverse of k1, but not of k2. Then the term restricted to
black-boxes is 〈n1, ∗, e(〈∗, e(t3, k2)〉, ∗)〉, where t1, t2 and k1
are replaced by ∗.
Definition 5.6. Let O = 〈L,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG and
O′ = 〈L′,IK ′,DC′,EQ′,TC′〉@tG′ be two observ-
ables, such that L = {(±1ms1) . . . (±nmsn)} and L′ =
{(±1ms′1) . . . (±nms′n)}. A black-box bijection, bij(O,O′)
is any bijection between the sets BB(O) and BB(O′)
such that bij(O,O′) makes the terms 〈ms1, . . . ,msn〉|BB(O)
and 〈ms′1, . . . ,ms′n〉|BB(O) equal.2
For example, there is no bijection between the terms in
L′′1 and L′′2 shown above. However, the bijection {e(t1, k1)↔
e(t′1, k
′
1), e(t2, k2) ↔ e(t′2, k′2)} makes equal the terms in L′′1
and the sequence of labels L′′′2 below:
L′′′2 = 〈(+e(t′1, k′1)), (+e(t′2, k′2)), (+〈e(t′1, k′1), e(t′2, k′2)〉)〉.
5.2. Term approximation
Notation: For the remainder of this section, to
avoid repetition, we will assume given two observ-
ables O = 〈L,IK ,DC,EQ,TC〉@tG and O′ =
2One can easily compute one such bijection by recursively traversing
terms and checking which ones are black-boxed or not. This procedure is
implemented in the file obs-equiv.maude, function mkSSBB.
〈L′,IK ′,DC′,EQ′,TC′〉@tG′ with disjoint sets of term
and time symbols and of nonces. Moreover, bij = bij(O,O′)
is a bijection between the black-box terms of the observables
O and O′.
First we handle black boxed in the same way as nonces:
given a bijection with n relations:
bij = {ms1 ↔ ms′1, . . . ,msn ↔ ms′n}
We create n new nonces nν1, . . . , n
ν
n and replace each occur-
rence of msi in O and ms′i in O′ by the same nonce nνi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the following we assume that this replacement
has been already performed.
We define when a symbolic term approximates another
one.
Definition 5.7. Let ms and ms′ be two symbolic terms
in, respectively, O and O′. The term ms approximates
ms′, written ms O,O′ ms′ if for all ground terms
m ∈ DC |EQ (ms), then m ∈ DC′ |EQ′ (ms′). Two
terms are equivalent, written ms ∼O,O′ ms′ if and only
if ms O,O′ ms′ and ms′ O,O′ ms.
A problem with the definition above is the quantifica-
tion over all terms, which is an infinite set. We define in
Definition 5.12 a procedure, called termEqApprox which
checks for the observational equivalence of terms. It uses
the auxiliary functions termApprox and canEq.
We start by defining the function termApprox which uses
the auxiliary function symDer.
Definition 5.8. Let ms and ms′ be terms in, respectively,
O and O′. The predicate termApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′)
evaluates to true if and only if the two conditions below
are satisfied:
1) There exists a matching substitution θ = {sym′1 7→
ms1, . . . , sym′n 7→ msn} mapping symbols in ms′ to
subterms in ms, such that, θ[ms′] = ms;
2) For each sym′i 7→ msi ∈ θ, we have
symDer(sym′i ,msi,DC,DC′) (Definition 5.9).
Definition 5.9. Let sym′ be a symbol in O′ and
dc(sym′,S′) ∈ DC′ and ms be a term in O. We say
that symDer(sym′,ms,DC,DC′) if one of the following
holds:
• ms is an guessable;
• ms is a key, then ms ∈ S′;
• ms is a nonce n, then n ∈ S′;
• ms is an encryption e(ms1, k) < BB(O), then
symDer(sym′, 〈ms1, k〉,DC,DC′);
• ms = 〈ms1, . . . ,msn〉, then
symDer(sym′,msi,DC,DC′) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• ms = sym is a symbol such that dc(sym,S) ∈ DC, then
for each ms1 ∈ S, symDer(sym′,ms1,DC,DC′).
We prove the following soundness and completeness
results for the functions symDer and termApprox:
Theorem 5.10. Let ms and ms′ be two terms. The for all
m ∈ DC(ms), we have m ∈ DC(ms′) if and only if
termApprox(ms,ms′,DC,DC′).
Example : We illustrate the procedure termApprox with an
example. Consider
ms = 〈n, e(〈n, t, sym1, sym2〉, k1)〉
ms′ = 〈n′, e(sym′, k1)〉
Moreover, assume that the intruder knows the inverse of k1
in both observables, that is, k−11 ∈ IK ∩ IK ′, and consider
the bijection bij = bij(O,O′) = {n ↔ n′}. We replace these
nonces by the fresh nonce nν.
We check for Condition 5.8.1, that is, construct a match-
ing substitution mapping symbols in ms′ to subterms in ms.
We obtain the following matching substitution:
θ = {sym′ 7→ 〈nν, t, sym1, sym2〉}
as θ[ms′] = 〈nν, e(〈n′, t, sym1, sym2〉, k1)〉.
Notice that if such a matching substitution does not ex-
ists, then the ms cannot approximate ms′. Indeed ms′ O,O′
ms as there is no such matching substitution: The term ms′
can be instantiated to a term where a non-tuple is encrypted,
e.g., 〈n1, e(t, k1)〉 for some guessable t, whereas ms can only
be instantiated by terms where a tuple with at least four
elements is encrypted.
Now we check for the Condition 5.8.2. In order to check
this condition, we need to know more about DC and DC′.
Assume that the symbol sym1 is created before the symbol
sym2 in the trace corresponding to O. Then by Proposi-
tion 4.12, we have that if dc(sym1,S1), dc(sym2,S2) ∈ DC,
then S1 ⊆ S2.
Consider, dc(sym1, {t1, k1}), dc(sym2, {t1, t2, k1, k2}) ∈DC which satisfies the condition above. Moreover, assume
dc(sym′,S′) ∈ DC′ with S′ = {nν, t1, k1, t2, k2}.
We have that symDer(sym′, {n, sym1, sym2},DC,DC′)
as:
• symDer(sym′, nν,DC,DC′) as nν ∈ S′;
• symDer(sym′, sym1,DC,DC′) as {t1, k1} ⊆ S′;
• symDer(sym′, sym2,DC,DC′) as {t1, t2, k1, k2} ⊆ S′;
The following definition specifies the function canEq.
Intuitively, canEq checks whether it is possible to instantiate
w.r.t. DC,EQ the symbols in ms1,ms2 so to falsify the
constraint neq(ms1,ms2).
Definition 5.11. canEq(ms1,ms2,DC,EQ) evaluates to true
if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) If is a unifier σ = [sym1 7→ ms∗1, . . . , symn 7→ ms∗n] of
ms1 and ms2;
2) σ does not make any comparison constraint in EQ false;
3) For each symi 7→ ms∗i ∈ σ, symi can generate the term
ms∗i w.r.t. DC.
Definition 5.12. Let ms and ms′ be terms in, respectively,
O and O′. The predicate termEqApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′)
evaluates to true if and only if:
1) If eqCheck(EQ,DC) = f alse;
2) Otherwise if eqCheck(EQ,DC) =
eqCheck(EQ′,DC′) = true, let ssb and ssb′ being
the corresponding witnessing matching subsitutions
(Definition 3.8);
a) termApprox(ssb[ms], ssb′[ms′], ssb[DC], ssb′[DC′])
is true where the witnessing matching subsitution is
θ = [sym′1 7→ ms1, . . . , sym′n 7→ msn] (Definition 5.8);
b) canEq(ssb[θ[ms′1]], ssb[θ[ms
′
2]],DC,EQ) is false
(Definition 5.11) for each inequality constraint
neq(m′1,m
′
2) ∈ EQ′.
Intuitively, the Condition 5.12.1 specifies that if EQ,DC
are not consistent, then the approximation is trivial. Oth-
erwise, if both EQ,DC and EQ′,DC′ are consistent, then
there are matching substitutions ssb and ssb′. We apply
ssb and ssb′ substitutions in, respectively, O and O′ in
the following. This takes care of all the eq constraints.
Condition 5.12.2a checks whether the terms they generate
are the same. Condition 5.12.2b intuitively checks whether
it is not possible to falsify any inequality constraint in EQ′
using DC and EQ.
Theorem 5.13. Let ms and ms′ be two terms from, re-
spectively, O and O′. Then ms O,O′ ms′ if and only if
termEqApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′).
Example Consider the protocol role for Alice in Exam-
ple 4.3. We omit the time constraints as they are not
important for this example. From an initial configuration
with Alice and the intruder called eve, one can construct
the following observable O′:
〈+e(〈n′1, alice〉, pk(eve)),−sym′,+error〉,IK ′,DC′, {neq(sym′, e(〈n1, v〉, pk(alice)})}
for some intruder knowledge IK ′ and DC′.
Consider the protocol role which outputs an error:
Alice′ := (new Na), (+e(〈Na, alice〉, pk(Z))), (−v), (+error)
Consider the observable O for this protocol:
〈+e(〈n1, alice〉, pk(eve)),−sym,+error〉,IK ,DC, ∅)}
which is similar to the observable above, but without the
comparison constraint. There is the bijection n1 ↔ n′1.
Moreover, since the message is sent to eve, n1 ∈ IK and
n′1 ∈ IK ′.
Notice that
termApprox(〈e(〈n1, alice〉, pk(eve)), sym, error〉,
〈e(〈n′1, alice〉, pk(eve)), sym′, error〉,DC,DC′)
as the messages are the same. However, due to the compar-
ison constraint in O, it is not the case that
termEqApprox(〈e(〈n1, alice〉, pk(eve)), sym, error〉,
〈e(〈n′1, alice〉, pk(eve)), sym′, error〉,O,O′)
Indeed, the function canEq(sym, e(〈n1, t〉, pk(alice)},DC, ∅)
is true. (Recall that variables are replaced by fresh symbols.)
This is true because the intruder knows the public key of
Alice and n1.
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Figure 2. Timed Observational Equivalence Solver Architecture.
5.3. Timing of Messages
For Condition 5.3.5, we reduce the formulas to formulas
for which existing solvers can be used [17], namely formulas
of the form ∃∀:
∀t˜t.
[
TC ⇒ ∃t˜t′. [TC′ ∧ tG1 = tG′1 ∧ · · · ∧ tGN = tG′N]] is a tautology
⇔ ¬∀t˜t.
[
TC ⇒ ∃t˜t′. [TC′ ∧ tG1 = tG′1 ∧ · · · ∧ tGN = tG′N]] is unsat
⇔ ∃t˜t.
[
TC ∧ ∀t˜t′. [TC′ ⇒ ¬ [tG1 = tG′1 ∧ · · · ∧ tGN = tG′N]]] is unsat
In our implementation, we use the SMT solver Yices for
solving this formula (which is decidable [17]), where all
time variables have type Reals.
Lemma 5.14. Determining whether two timed observables
are equivalent is decidable.
Together with Proposition 4.11, we obtain the decidabil-
ity of timed observational equivalence checking.
Theorem 5.15. Determining whether two configurations are
time observationally equivalent is decidable.
6. Experimental Results
We implemented a tool that checks for timed observa-
tional equivalence. Its architechture is depicted in Figure 2.
It is constructed over the tools:
• Maude: We implemented in Maude all the machinery
necessary specifying timed protocols as well as checking
the term equivalence of observables. Moreover, since
its alpha 111 version, Maude allows to call the CVC4
SMT solver [4] from inside Maude programs. This al-
lows the implementation of Rewriting Modulo SMT by
using conditional rewrite rules that are only allowed to
rewrite if the resulting constraint set is satisfiable. For
our applications, this means the set of time constraints;
• YICES-EF: Since CVC4 does not provide the API for
checking ∃∀ formulas needed for proving time equiv-
alence, we integrated our Maude machinery with the
solver YICES-EF which can check for the satisfiability
of such formulas. This integration has been carried out
by using the IOP framework [27].
Verification is coordinated by the IOP implementation.
Given two initial configuration C and C′ to be checked for
Scenario Result Observables States
Red-Pill Not Equiv 19/19 74/74
Passport Not Equiv 36/27 138/112
Passport-Corrected Equiv 36/27 138/112
Anonymous Not Equiv 2/3 7/9
TABLE 1. Experimental Results. Each experiment involves the proving
the timed observational equivalence of two configurations. It contains
number of observables (traces) for each configuration and the total
number of states in the whole search tree required to traverse to
enumerate all observables.
their timed observational equivalence, IOP sends a command
to the Maude+CVC4 tool to enumerate all obsevables for C
and C′, computes for each observable O of C the set of term-
equivalent observables {O′1, . . . ,O′n} of C′ and vice-versa. If
Maude finds some observable of C that does not have at
least one matching pair, that is, n = 0, C and C′ are not
equivalent. (Similarly for some pair of C′.) Otherwise, we
continue by the timing equivalence condition. IOP attempts
to find at least one time equivalent observable O′i for O.
If it does not find it, then C and C′ are not equivalent.
It does this checking by building the formula as described
in Section 5.3 for checking for the timing equivalence of
O with O′i . If YICES-EF returns Unsat, they are equivalent.
Otherwise they are not equivalent and IOP tries with another
observable.
Experimental Results We carried out the following experi-
ments:
• Red Pill Example: Consider the timed protocol specified
in Example 4.6. We checked whether it is possible for an
intruder to distinguish whether an application is running
over a virtual machine or not. That is, we checked
whether an initial configuration with a player running an
application over a virtual machine is timed equivalent to
the initial configuration with a player running the same
application over a non-virtual machine.
• Passport Example: Consider the timed protocol speci-
fied in Example 4.5. We checked whether the intruder
can distinguish the following two configurations both
with two protocol sessions: the first where both protocol
sessions are carried out with the same passport and the
second where the protocol sessions are carried out with
different passports.
• Corrected Passport Example: We additionally consid-
ered a modification of the Passport example where the
timed protocol is corrected in the sense that it sends
necessarily both error messages at the same time.
• Anonymous Protocol: Consider the timed protocol spec-
ified in Example 4.7. We checked whether it is possible
for an intruder to distinguish whether two players belong
to the same group or not. That is, we checked whether the
initial configuration with a player that receives a message
from a member of the same group is timed equivalent
to the initial configuration with a player that receives a
message from a player of a different group.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our experiments. Our
tool was able to (correctly) identify the cases when the given
configurations are timed observational equivalent. More im-
pressive, however, is the number of states and observables
it needed to traverse for doing so. In all experiments the
number of states in the whole search tree was less than 140
states and the number of observables were less than 40. This
is a very small number when compared to usual applications
in Maude (which can handle thousands of states even when
using Rewriting Modulo SMT [30]). This demonstrate the
advantage of representing timing symbolically. As expected
the number of observable for the passport example were
greater as its configurations had two protocol session, while
in the remaining experiments configurations have only one
protocol session. Finally, since the number of observables
was small, the number of calls to Yices was small and
therefore, verification for all experiments took less than
some seconds.
7. Related and Future Work
This paper introduced a novel definition of timed equiva-
lence for security protocols using symbolic time constraints.
We demonstrated how symbolic time equivalence can be
proved automatically with the use of Rewriting Modulo
SMT and existing SMT-solvers. The combination of such
constraints with Rewriting Modulo SMT greatly reduces
the number of states required to enumerate all traces. We
implemente the machinery for proving the timed obser-
vational equivalence and and showed experimentally with
some proof-of-concept examples that our technique is prac-
tical.
For future work, we will be integrating the machinery
developed here with the Maude libraries [16] which can be
used for the verification of security protocols that use weaker
notions of encryption. We are also interested in integrating
the machinery developed with Narrowing and Maude-NPA.
Related Work: The literature on symbolic verification is
vast [5], [9], [14], [14], [18], [20]. However, most of this
work uses symbolic reasoning for proving reachability prop-
erties.
One exception is the work of [14]. Indeed, for the
observational equivalence involving terms, we have been
heavily inspired by [14], but there are some differences. The
main difference is that our timed protocols includes both
time symbols and branching. Also, we also implemented
our machinery for term equivalence in Maude and use SMT-
solvers for search (Rewriting Modulo SMT) and proving the
timing equivalence.
Cheval and Cortier [10] propose a definition of timed
equivalence reducing it to other notions of equivalence tak-
ing into account the length of messages. We take a different
approach by using timed constraints and SMT-Solvers. This
allows us to relate time symbols using inequalities, e.g.,
tt1 ≥ tt2 + 10. While a more detailed comparison is left to
future work, the use time symbols allows the use of off-the-
shelf SMT-solvers which are constantly improving. Indeed,
as reported in [10], the corrected version of the Passport
Example did not terminate after two days of experiments.
The recent work [20] demonstrates how to automate the
prove of observational equivalence of protocols that may
contain branching and xor. While we allow for branching,
we do not consider theories involving xor. However, we do
consider timing aspects, which is not considered in [20].
Thus these work are complementary. As described above,
we expect in the future to support xor (and other equational
theories) by using the built-in Maude matching and unifica-
tion functionality [16].
Finally, there have been other frameworks for the verifi-
cation of timing properties of systems [6], [19], [21], [24],
[26]. A main difference is that the properties verified were
reachability properties and not timed equivalence.
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Appendix
1. Constraint Solver Algorithm
We define the function sgen that will compute a finite set
of such pairs such that every derivable instance is covered
by some pair. In particular, sgen takes as input:
• ms – the symbolic term to be generated;
• IK – the intruder knowledge;
• ssb – a symbol substitution of symbols to symbolic
terms, initially empty (∅). Intuitively, these represent
the symbols which are no longer constrained in the set
of derivability constraints, but should be replaced by a
particular symbolic term;
• DC – a set of derivability constraints which specify the
symbols in ms and IK and the range of ssb.
sgen(ms,IK , ssb,DC) returns a set solutions: pairs
〈ssb1,DC1〉, . . . , 〈ssbn,DCn〉
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ssbi is the symbol substitution with
the symbols that have been resolved and DCi a set of
derivability constraints refining DC.
sgen(ms,IK , ssb,DC) is defined as follows:3 4
• ms is a symbol: if ms ∈ DC or ms has guessable type,
then return {ssb,DC}, otherwise the symbol must be
constrained, return {ssb,DCdc(ms,IK)};
• ms is a nonce: if ms ∈ IK , then return {ssb,DC},
otherwise return the empty set (no solution);
• ms is a guessable constant, such as, player name, public
keys, etc: return {ssb,DC};
• ms = {ms1, . . . ,msn}: iterate through the tuple ele-
ments accumulating symbol substitutions and symbol
constraints;
• ms = e(ms1,ms2): There are two possibilities:
– The intruder is able to derive ms: This is done by simply
calling sgen on the tuple {ms1,ms2};
– The intruder possesses an encryption term ms1 that is
unifiable with ms. For this, we proceed in two steps.
First, we treat symbols as variables and attempt to
unify ms with terms in IK , checking for cycles (occur-
checks). Once all unifications (symbol substitutions) are
found, we only keep the unifications that are consistent
with DC. This is done by accumulating the constraints
returned by the function checkSubst(ssbi, ssb, ds), de-
fined below, for each unification ssbi. Note that the
domains of ssbi and ssb are disjoint.
The function checkSubst(ssb0, ssb,DC) the set of consis-
tent refinements of {ssb0, ssb,DC}. It processes a binding,
symi 7→ msi, in ssb0 in the context of a pair {ssb,DC}
producing the set of solutions css = {ssb j,DC j}, 1 ≤ j ≤ k
that refine {ssb,DC}, and bind symi to an instance of
msi using chkBnd(symi,msi, ssb,DC). The next binding is
processed in the context of each element of css produced
by processing the preceeding bindings.
The function chkBnd(sym,ms, ssb,DC) works as fol-
lows
• if sym is not constrained in DC, then chkBnd returns
{(sym 7→ ms)ssb′,DC′} where ssb′ is the result of
applying sym 7→ ms to the range of ssb, and DC′ is
the result of applying sym 7→ ms to the terms in DC;
• if sym is constrained in DC, and ms is not a sym-
bol then, then chkBnd must ensure that ms is deriv-
able under the accumulated constraints. This can be
done by adding the binding sym 7→ ms to each solu-
tion returned by sgen(ms,IK , ssb1,DC1). Here DC =
3In our maude code, it is implemented as the function sGen1 in
constraints.maude.
4The freshly symbols are constrained only if necessary, to allow for
the possibility that it only appears in a encryption that can be matched in
IK .
DC0dc(sym,IK), ssb1 is the result of applying sym 7→
ms to the range of ssb, and DC1 is the result of applying
sym 7→ ms to the terms in DC0;
• if sym is constrained in DC, and ms is a symbol
that is not constrained in DC then return {(sym 7→
ms)ssb1,DC1dc(ms,IK)} where ssb1, DC1,IK are as
above.
• if sym is constrained in DC, and ms is a symbol
that is also constrained in DC then return {(sym 7→
ms)ssb1,DC1dc(ms,IK ′)} where ssb1, DC1 are as
above and IK ′ is the constraint of the earlier of sym,ms.
One symbol is earlier than another if if was generated in
an earlier step in the protocol exeution. Intruder knowl-
edge patterns increase over time, thus we are effectively
restricting to the lesser of the knowledge sets.
2. Proof of Theorem 5.10
Lemma A.1. Let ms be a term in O and sym′ a
symbol in O′. ms O,O′ sym′ if and only if
symDer(sym′,ms,DC,DC′).
Proof: We prove by induction on the greatest height, h,
of the symbols in ms in the the dependency graph of
the (acyclic) DC. In the following assume dc(sym′,S′) ∈
DC.
1) Base Case: If h = 0, that is, there are no symbols in ms,
that is, it is ground. We proceed by induction on ms.
a) Base Case 1: If ms is a guessable, then ms O,O′ sym′
and symDer(sym′,ms,DC,DC′) are both true;
b) Base Case 2: If ms is a nonce, then there are
two cases. Either, this nonce comes from a bijec-
tion, which means that ms O,O′ sym′ if and only if
n ∈ DC(sym′) if and only if n ∈ S′ if and only if
symDer(sym′,ms,DC,DC′). Otherwise, n ∈ DC(sym′)
if and only if symDer(sym′,ms,DC,DC′);
c) Inductive Case: If ms is a tuple 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉, then
ms O,O′ sym′ if and only if mi O,O′ sym′ if and only
if (by IH) symDer(sym′,mi,DC,DC′) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
d) Inductive Case: If ms is an encryption e(m, k), then
either it is a black-box and follows the same reasoning
as with the nonce case. Otherwise we appeal to the
inductive hypothesis as with the tuple case.
2) Inductive Case: If h = n+1 with n ≥ 0, then ms contains
some symbols. We proceed by induction on the size of
ms. Most of the cases have the same reasoning as before
in the proof of the base case (Case 1) with the exception
of the following base case:
a) Base Case: If ms is a symbol sym. Let dc(sym,S). All
ground terms in DC(sym,S) are built using the terms
in S. As DC is acyclic, all symbols in S have height of
at most n. Thus we appeal to the IH to prove this case.

Proof: We proceed by induction on the size of ms′.
• Base Case: ms′ is a symbol sym′. The matching substi-
tution is sym′ 7→ ms, which is handled by Lemma A.1.
• Other Base Cases ms′ = n′ is a nonce. Then
ms O,O′ n′ if and only if ms = bij[n′] if and
only if termApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′). If it is a guess-
able, then ms has to be the same guessable and
termApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′). Similar when ms′ is a key.
• Inductive Case: ms′ = e(ms′1, k
′) is an encrypted term.
Then it is either black-boxed, in which case the proof
is similar to the case when it is a nonce. Otherwise, we
appeal to the IH on the smaller terms ms′1 and k
′;
• Inductive Case: ms = {ms′1, . . . ,ms′n}, then we appeal
to the IH on the smaller terms ms′i .

3. Proof of Theorem 5.13
Lemma A.2. Let EQ = EQ1 ∪ EQ2 be a set of comparison
constraints, where EQ1 contains only equality constraints
and EQ2 inequality constraints. Let θ be the most general
unifier of all constraints in EQ1. For all ground terms m,
m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ if and only if m ∈ DC(θ[ms])|EQ2
Proof: m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ if and only if the pattern match
ssb of m and ms does not falsify any constraint in EQ if
and only if ssb is an instance of θ (as it is the m.g.u.) and
ssb does not falsify any constraint in EQ2 if and only if
m ∈ DC(θ(ms))|EQ2 . 
Lemma A.3. There is ground term m ∈ DC(ms1)|EQ and
m ∈ DC(ms2)|EQ with the same witnessing substitution
θ if and only if canEq(ms1,ms2,DC,EQ).
Proof: m ∈ DC(ms1)|EQ and m ∈ DC(ms2)|EQ with the
same substitution θ if and only if θ(ms1) = θ(ms2) = m if
and only if ms1 and ms2 can be unified by θ and θ satisfies
all constraints in EQ and for all symi 7→ m∗i ∈ θ, mi ∈DC(symi) (Definition ofDC(symi) membership) if and only
if canEq(ms1,ms2,DC,EQ). 
Lemma A.4. Let EQ be a finite set of inequality constraints
only. Assume DC  EQ. For all ground terms m we
have that m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ ⇒ m ∈ DC′(ms′) if and only
if m ∈ DC(ms)⇒ m ∈ DC′(ms)
Proof: The reverse direction is immediate. We prove the
forward direction. Assume (1) m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ ⇒ m ∈
DC′(ms′) for all ground terms m and assume that (2) m1 ∈
DC(ms). We show that m1 ∈ DC′(ms).
We proceed by induction on the size of ms. The inter-
esting case is when ms = sym is a symbol which means
that ms′ = sym′ has to be a symbol. Otherwise, it is easy to
construct a term m2 ∈ DC(ms)|EQ such that m2 < DC′(ms′).
(For example, a very large tuple of guessables.)
Let the matching symbol substitution ssb = [sym 7→
m1]. There are two cases:
• ssb does not some EQ false, then m1 ∈ DC(ms)|EQ and
thus m1 ∈ DC(ms) by (1).
• ssb falsifies some constraint in EQ. Assume by contra-
diction that m1 < DC′(ms). Since m1 ∈ DC(ms), an
arbitrary large tuple 〈m1, . . . ,m1〉 ∈ DC(ms). However,
since m1 < DC′(ms), then (3) 〈m1, . . . ,m1〉 < DC′(ms).
Pick a large tuple such that no constraint in EQ is
falsified. (Recall that all constraints in EQ are inequality
constraints.) Then 〈m1, . . . ,m1〉 ∈ DC(ms)|EQ. From (1),
we get 〈m1, . . . ,m1〉 ∈ DC′(ms) yielding a contradiction
with (3). Thus m1 ∈ DC′(ms).

Proof: ms O,O′ ms′ if and only if
• DC 2 EQ if and only if termEqApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′)
by Lemma 3.9;
• or DC  EQ and DC′  EQ′ and for all m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ,
we have that m ∈ DC′(ms′)|EQ′ . By Lemma A.2, we have
that m ∈ DC(ms)|EQ if and only if m ∈ DC(θ[ms])|EQ2 ,
where θ is the mgu of the equality constraints in EQ
and EQ2 are the inequality constraints. Similarly m ∈
DC′(ms′)|EQ′ if and only if m ∈ DC′(θ′[ms′])|EQ′2 . Thus
we only need to consider the inequality constraints EQ2
and EQ′2.
By contraposition, we attempt to find a term m ∈
DC(ms)|EQ2 such that m < DC′(ms′)|EQ′2 . This leads
to two possibilities, where ssb1, ssb′1 be the symbol
substitution such that ssb1[ms] = ssb′1[ms
′] = m. This
can only exists if ssb1[θ[ms′]] = m where θ is the
matching substitution of the symbols in ms′ to terms in
ms (as in Definition 5.8). Otherwise, the terms ms and
ms′ cannot derive the same terms.
– ssb′1 does not falsify a constraint in EQ′2 if and only
if m < DC′(ms′) if and only if by Lemma A.4 and
Theorem 5.10 termApprox(ms,ms′,O,O′) is false;
– ssb′1 falsifies a constraint in neq(ms1,ms2) ∈ EQ′2 if
and only if ssb1[θ(ms1)] = ssb1[θ(ms2)] if and only if
canEq(θ(ms1), θ(ms2),DC,EQ) is true (Lemma A.3).

